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EXECUTOR'S ELECTION TO CLAIM CERTAIN
DEDUCTIONS FOR INCOME OR ESTATE
TAX PURPOSES
FREDERICK K. Cox*
The executor' of an estate subject to federal estate tax is often in
a position to reduce the overall burden of federal taxes, income and
estate, borne by the estate and its beneficiaries.
The executor of a smaller estate, not subject to the federal estate
tax, sometimes has a comparable opportunity to reduce the burden on the
estate or family of the income tax alone.
The opportunity, and the special problems it may carry with it,
flow from a combination of:
1. the fact that, although federal estate and income taxes are
completely different concepts of taxation, one expenditure may well
meet the standards of deductibility of both taxes; and
2. the rule that the executor, with respect to his expenses
of administration, must in such case elect where he will ultimately
take his deduction.
The taxable income of an estate is in general taxed in the same
manner as that of an individual.2 Thus an executor is entitled to deduct
expenses incurred for the production or collection of income, for the
management or care of income property, as well as expenses of tax
determination.a However, for estate tax purposes, expenses in those classes,
when properly incurred by an executor, also usually constitute deductible
administration expenses. 4
Congress, however, has said, in effect, that the executor is entitled
to the benefit of the deduction of such an administration expense for the
estate's income tax or for the estate tax, but not both.5 The 1954 Code
labels this rule as a "Disallowance of Double Deductions." This is a
convenient tag, but hardly accurate, since the two deductions dealt with
are authorized under two separate taxes.
Of The Cleveland Trust Company; member of the Ohio Bar.
1 The term "executor" is used in the broad sense of the definition thereof
in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2203, to include administrator or other personal
representative.
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 641.
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212. Regulations provide: "Reasonable amounts
paid or incurred by the fiduciary of an estate or trust on account of administration
expenses, including fiduciaries' fees and expenses of litigation, which are ordinary
and necessary in connection with the performance of the duties of administration
are deductible under section 212, notwithstanding that the estate or trust is not
engaged in a trade or business, except to the extent that such expenses are allocable
to the production or collection of tax-exempt income." Rev. Reg. § 1.212-1(i).
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053.
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 642(g).
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This election, forced on the executor by the double deduction
disallowance, was not new with the 1954 Code.6 However, the tax
saving opportunities it offers and the administrative problems it may
create, are now receiving increasing attention. 7
In this discussion we will look at the three major questions to be
considered by an executor in exercising his election; but the executor
has a preliminary determination to make. Although an expense may tent-
atively appear to meet the deduction standards of both the estate income
and estate taxes, those standards are by no means the same. Thus, tlhe
executor's election may be determined by comparative firmness of de-
ductibility rather than comparative tax rates. Clearly, a deduction sup-
portable at ten per cent may be a wiser election than one debatable at
twenty per cent.
Specifically, what sort of expenses are apt to be the subject of the
executor's election? There is a letter, printed, but not published by the
Service, discussing many of them.' Its unofficial status makes it non-
authoritative, but it serves as a useful collation. The letter lists the
following as being administration expenses in the estate tax sense, which
may also meet estate income tax standards of deductibility:
1. executor's commissions charged in one sum for services in
assembling and collecting estate assets, paying debts and
claims, making estate and inheritance tax returns and cur-
rent income tax returns and handling the same with the
tax examiners, distributing estate assets to devisees and
legatees and conserving the estate during the period of
administration (the duties, services and responsibilities
usually covered by "executor's commissions");
2. attorneys' fees for service in connection with the above
matters;
3. accountants' fees for services in connection with the above
matters;
4. annual premium on executor's fidelity bond;
5. compensation paid to a custodian or caretaker of estate
property during period of administration;
6. fees paid to the probate court for probating will and partial
settlements and final settlement of executor;
6The source of Section 642(g) is INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 162(e).
7For a recent law review article containing a comprehensive discussion
of the executor's election, including consideration of suggested changes in the
existing estate income tax, and presenting a proposal for revision, see Gradwohl,
Current Issues in Probate Estate Income Tax Allocation, 37 NEB. L. REv. 329
(1958). For report of institute proceedings see Randall, Consequences of Execu-
tor's Elections as to Administrative Expenses, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX
1011 (1957). For discussion of several probate income tax problems, see Miller,
Federal Income Tax Problems in Probate Practice, 43 IowA L. REv. 337 (1958).
8Letter signed Lester W. Utter, Chief, Individual Income Tax Branch,
May 24, 1954, 7 P-H 1954 FED. TAx SERV. ff 76,782.
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7. appraisers' fee for appraising estate assets for death tax
returns;
8. traveling expenses in connection with assembling or col-
lecting estate assets, paying debts, protests or suits on estate
and inheritance taxes, distribution of assets to legatees and
devisees.
A list such as the above only suggests the more common expenses
which may meet both estate tax and estate income tax deduction standards.
Any disbursement or cost incurred by an executor should be sufbmitted to
the deduction tests of both income and estate taxes.9 As an example, the
Service has recently ruled that the executor may include in deductible
administration expenses, for estate tax purposes, expenses incurred in
caring for and feeding cattle held for sale."0 Such expenses would also
constitute a deduction under Section 212 as expenditures incurred in the
maintenance of property held for production of income, since income in
this context includes gains from the disposition of property.
1
'
What about expenses incurred in selling estate property? If an
executor sells stock held in the estate in order to pay taxes, and a capital
gain is recognized by the estate, a broker's commission on the sale would
be an expense of administration for estate tax purposes; at the same
time, such a commission would constitute an offset against the sale price
in determining capital gain on the sale. 3 The Service has ruled,1 4 'how-
ever, that expenses of sale of estate property are subject to the operation
of Section 6 42(g), holding that such expenses may not be used as an
offset against the sale price in determining gain or loss where they have
already been allowed as a federal estate tax deduction. Although this
ruling may be within the spirit of Section 642(g), it does violence to its
9 There is an interplay between Section 2054 and Section 165(c) (3) analo-
gous to that between Section 2053 and Section 212. Election is required by
Section 642(g) with respect to losses arising from fire, storm, shipwreck or other
casualty, or from theft, not compensated for by insurance. However, "A special
rule apparently applies in the case of casualty losses since the basic provision
allowing a deduction for such losses specifically denies an income tax deduction
if the casualty losses have been claimed on the estate tax return." 6 MERTEMNs,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 36.101 (1957). But note that the Proposed Regula-
tions under the 1954 Code, while containing the following sentence: "No loss
described in this subdivision shall be allowed, if at the time the return is filed,
such loss has been claimed for estate tax purposes in the estate tax return,"
appear to contemplate allowance of the income tax deduction if it is established
that the loss has not been allo'wed under Section 2054, and provided a waiver
is filed. § 1.165-3(a) (7) (iii), 21 FED. REG. 4925 (1956).
1 0 Rev. Rul. 58436, 1958 INT. REV. BULL. No. 35, at 8.
1 1 Rev. Reg. § 1.212-1(a) (2) (b).
12 Rev. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d).
3 Rev. Reg. § 1.263 (a)-2(e).
14 Rev. Rul. 43, 1956-1 Cumz. BULL. 210.
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terms since it is difficult to see how a sale price offset can be called a
deduction. The ruling has been vigorously criticized.' 5
Expenses allowable as deductions in connection with income in
respect of decedents are specifically exempted by Section 6 42 (g), and
hence, not subject to the disallowance of double deduction. If we net
out the negatives here, we may say that such expenses are both estate and
income tax deductions if they meet the standards for deductibility under
both.
After the executor has determined what expenses are supportable
deductions under 'both estate income and estate taxes and are therefore
subject to his election, he faces these questions:
First, the mechanics of exercising and preserving his right,
Second, the tax dollar effects of the alternatives, and
Third, the effects those alternatives may have on the distribution of
estate income and corpus and the shifting of tax benefits and burdens
among beneficiaries.
MECHANICS OF THE ELECTION
The Congress and the Service are quite liberal as to both the time
and the technique of the executor's election. To claim an income tax
deduction, the executor files a statement in duplicate first, that any item
of administration expense claimed as an income tax deduction has not
been allowed as a deduction from the gross estate under Section 2053,
and, second, that all rights are waived to have such item allowed at any
time as a Section 2053 deduction. The earliest permissible filing of such
statement is with the related income tax return; the latest is just prior to
the expiration of the statutory period of limitation on the related income
tax return.-" To claim an estate tax deduction, the executor refrains
from filing a statement with or related to the income tax return and
claims the deduction in the estate tax return.'
7
It is apparent from the regulations that the executor can claim the
same expense as a deduction on both estate and income tax returns,
despite the fact that Congress prohibits a double deduction.1' To do so,
he simply claims deductions on both returns and refrains from filing a
15 Pincus, Expenses of Sale by Estates, 95 TRUSTS & ESrATES 1004 (1956);
Sutter, Income Taxation of Estates, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1108 (1956).
16 Rev. Reg. § 1.642(g)-i.
1T Rev. Reg. § 20.2053-1(d).
18 Revenue Regulation Section 1.642(g)-i (1956) provides in part: "Allow-
ance of a deduction in computing an estate's taxable income is not precluded
by claiming a deduction in the estate tax return, so long as the estate tax deduc-
tion is not finally allowed and the statement is filed." In Rev. Rul. 58484, 1958
INT. REv. BULL. No. 40, it was held that the phrase "finally allowed" used in the
quoted portion of the regulations "may be construed as referring to an estate tax
return in which the deduction in question has been allowed and with respect to
which the statute of limitations on assessment has expired, or in which for any
other reason, such as a closing agreement, an assessment of a deficiency resulting
from disallowance of the deduction is prohibited."
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statement of election with his income tax return. There is no impropriety
in so claiming double deduction, and there may be valid reasons for it.
The election statement once filed is binding.' 9 The executor may feel
that until his returns are audited, he cannot determine ultimately effective
tax rates, and hence cannot know his better course.
Although the executor may defer filing until just prior to expiration
of the statute of limitations on the income tax return, he is not assured
of so long a period. On examination of the estate's income tax return,
an agent may properly require the executor to file his statement electing
the income tax deduction, or alternatively accept disallowance.
The executor also has freedom to allocate one expense item to the
estate tax return and another to the income tax return.2" Further, he
may break up a single item-attorney fees as an example-and allocate
part to deduction under one tax, and the balance to the other tax.
21
This may have a practical administrative advantage. The estate tax
regulations permit claiming a reasonable estimate for attorney fees.
2 2
It may be convenient to let this estimate stand, even though a larger
amount has been or will be paid, and claim as an income tax deduction
the amount of fees actually paid in excess of the estimated amount
claimed on the estate tax return.
TAX DOLLAR EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVES
Comforted by the fact that he may long defer finality in his double
deduction election, the executor weighs the tax benefits of his alternatives.
Does he have a duty to do so? A California court has indicated that the
judicious course of the discreet executor is to seek maximum tax benefit
where there is a "wvide disparity" between estate and income tax rates.
2 3
That somewhat tentative expression of the existence of a direction of
duty may well be as far as the rule should go. When he files his returns
the executor may be able to make only an educated, and perhaps opti-
mistic, guess as to the dollar tax benefit of a particular deduction. It
would be unfair and impractical to evaluate the effects of his double
deduction election performance apart from his overall handling of the
estate's major tax problems. Furthermore, as considered below, a strin-
gent rule requiring maximum tax benefit from each election would be
unrealistic where the election may have a warping effect on distributions.
Whatever rule may be developed, however, the executor does have
the pragmatic problem of satisfying the beneficiaries of the estate that
19"[A]fter a statement is filed under section 642(g) with respect to a
particular item or portion of an item, the item cannot thereafter be allowed as a
deduction for estate tax purposes since the waiver operates as a relinquishment
of the right to have the deduction allowed at any time under section 2053 or section
2054." Rev. Reg. § 1.642(g)-1.
2 0 Rev. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2.
21 Rev. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2.
22 Rev. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (c) (1).
23 Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 337, 295 P.2d 68, 74 (1956).
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he has done a competent job. Those beneficiaries are taxpayers, too, and
apt to be devoted to the principle of minimizing tax burdens. In this
context state court judges may also be deduction-minded taxpayers.
Therefore, it is submitted that the executor should chart his election and
deduction course with minimum tax burden as a most desirable goal.
In looking at the tax dollar effects of his election, the executor
cannot limit his examination to the rate tables. He must think in terms
of effective rates. Where the full marital deduction is claimed the
effective rate of tax saving from an estate tax deduction of an ad-
ministration expense is roughly one-half of the nominal estate tax rate.
The effective rate phenomenon also appears in the income tax
computation where the estate has a material amount of tax exempt in-
come. The regulations require that expenses, which are not directly
attributable to a specific class of income, must be apportioned to both
taxable and non-taxable income." The expenses which must be so
apportioned are those which as to the estate are in the nature of indirect
or overhead expenses. Thus, executor's fees are overhead and must be
apportioned. A property management fee allocable to rents would be
directly chargeable to fully taxable income and not apportionable.
Therefore, an executor who receives a material amount of tax exempt
income might achieve maximum tax saving by taking overhead expenses
as estate tax deductions and direct expenses allocable to taxable income
as income tax deductions.
Determination of the effective estate tax rate may involve not only
an estimate of the rate for the estate currently under administration, but
conceivably may require a projection of the estate tax rate of a residuary
legatee. If administration expense is deducted on the estate income tax
return rather than the estate tax return, there will, of course, be an
increase in estate tax. To the extent this is borne by a residuary legatee
who thereafter dies, Section 2013 may afford an offsetting increase in
the credit for property previously taxed in the estate of the deceased
legatee. This will be of rare application and in any event is a practical
consideration only where the residuary legatee dies during the course of
administration. It does, however, point up the necessity of looking well
beyond rate tables in determining the tax dollar effects of the executor's
election.
The executor's fiscal period problems and opportunities have an
interaction with the executor's election. It is here that the executor of
the smaller estate, not subject to federal estate tax, probably has his most
favorable opportunity to save income taxes for the estate and family as
an economic unit. It is pointed out, supra,2" how the executor through
proper selection of a fiscal year for -the estate can not only minimize
24 Rev. Reg. §§ 1.652(b)-3, 1.265-1(c). Compare Rev. Rul. 59-32, 1959 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 4, at 17.
25 Williams, Picking A Fiscal Year, Timing and Nature of Distributions,
20 OHIO ST. L.J. 16 (1959).
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taxes, but also to some extent control the time when the income will be
taxed.
EFFECTS OF ELECTION ALTERNATIVES ON BENEFICIARIES
In an estate where the executor's income is distributable to the
residuary 'beneficiary, the executor may base his election solely on tax
benefits. However, where the income and residuary interests are not
the same he may find that an election, based on comparison of effective
tax rates, may warp the interests of competing 'beneficiaries.
The warping effect of the election most commonly arises from:
1. the fact that, usually, the effective income tax rate is higher
than the effective estate tax rate, so that administration
expenses are more profitably deducted on the executor's in-
come tax return, combined with
2. the fact that, for probate accounting purposes, expenses of
administration are usually principal charges which have the
effect of reducing the residuary estate.
In some of the few reported cases where the distorting effect of
the executor's election has 'been the subject of beneficiary complaint and
judical adjustment, the fact pattern has been broadly this:
1. an election by the executor to take administration expenses
on his estate income tax return;
2. an increase in estate tax over what it would have been had
expenses 'been taken as an estate tax deduction-a burden
borne by residuary 'beneficiaries who do not share in estate
income;
3. a decrease in the aggregate of estate and income taxes
payable by the executor; and
4. a demand by the residuary beneficiaries that they be made
at least whole.
The representative of the remaindermen in the Warms case
2 6
claimed, alternatively, that administration expenses should be charged to
income when they are taken as income tax deductions, or that the prin-
cipal account should be credited at least with the saving which would
have resulted in estate tax had the expenses been deducted in the compu-
tation of that tax. The surrogate first ruled that the election option
granted to the executor by the Internal Revenue Code cannot affect the
propriety of the charge of administration expenses to principal. How-
ever, he did hold that the corpus of the residuary trust should be credited
with the amount which represents the estate tax saving which it would
have received had the administration expenses been deducted from prin-
cipal in computing the estate tax.
In the Bixby case,27 it has been pointed out that the parties were
faced with five alternatives ranging from no adjustment to a sharing by
26 Estate of Warms, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
27 Estate of Bixby, supra note 23.
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the income beneficiary of part of -her income tax benefits with remainder-
men. 2' The court followed Warms,2" requiring the principal to be re-
stored to where it would have ,been had the expenses been taken as income
tax deductions, but permitting the income beneficiary to retain the net
tax savings in excess of the amount so restored.
The Internal Revenue Service has considered the interaction of the
executor's election and the determination of the marital deduction. In
Revenue Ruling 55-225,"0 the Service held that the ceiling on the
marital deduction of fifty per cent of the value of the adjusted gross
estate is increased by an election to take administration expenses as income
tax deductions. It was held that the ceiling is to be determined by
subtracting from the entire value of the gross estate the aggregate
amount of the deductions actually claimed and allowed. However, the
Service also said that the marital deduction cannot exceed the value of
the property interests which actually pass to the spouse, and where such
interests are in fact reduced by administration expenses, the marital de-
duction is likewise reduced. Thus, where an item of expense is claimed
as an income tax deduction, ibut in the administration of the estate the
expense is charged against principal, there is a proportionate reduction in
the value of the property actually passing to the spouse. Here what the
spouse receives is less than fifty per cent of the adjusted gross estate, and
it is this lesser figure which will determine the marital deduction.
In Revenue Ruling 55-642,1 the Service considered the effect of
the election where the decedent bequeaths to his surviving spouse one-half
of the value of his adjusted gross estate as determined for federal estate
tax purposes. Here the Service held that the election to deduct adminis-
tration expenses on the income tax return increases not only the fifty
per cent of adjusted gross estate ceiling, ;but also the value of what the
spouse actually receives, thus increasing the marital deduction. The
Service filed a caveat that this may not have been what the testator
intended."
28 Gradwohl, supra note 7, at 358-60.
29 Estate of Warms, supra note 26, has also been followed in Bell's Estate,
8 Chest. 21, 7 Fiduciary 1 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1958), and in Levy, cited note 33 infra
on another point. In Levy there was an income tax saving of $25,000 at the cost of
a $7,000 increase in estate tax, as a result of deducting administration expenses
on the income tax return.
30 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 460.
31 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 386.
32 "Questions relating to the effect of the use of the marital deduction formula
on the value of property passing to the surviving spouse are not within the
jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Service. However, the possibility that it may
not have been the intention of the decedent by using the marital deduction formula
clause to give his wife more than one-half of the net distributable estate after
payment of debts and administration expenses, may give beneficiaries other than
the wife a right to question any act of the executors which operates to decrease
their interests under the will." Ibid.
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In Estate of Levy,"33 the testator -bequeathed to his widow a sum
equivalent to one-half of his adjusted gross estate. The surrogate noted
that the use of administration expenses as deductions for estate income
tax purposes rather than estate tax purposes resulted in an increase in the
adjusted gross estate by the amount of such expenses and an increase of
the widow's bequest by one-half that amount. The question, however,
was not whether the widow could keep the increase but rather what
action should be taken to adjust for the increased estate tax. The court
ruled that no part of the estate tax adjustment should be credited to the
widow's bequest since it is freed of tax. The executors were directed to
credit the benefit of all deductions which would -have been available to
the estate principal to the residuary estate.
Where a widow elects to take under the law rather than under the
will, the executor in Ohio may face an algebraic problem in determining
the effect on beneficiaries of his election to deduct administration ex-
penses on the estate's income tax return. In Campbell v. Lloyd34 it was
held that where the widow elects to take under the law, her share of
the net estate35 was to be determined after the deduction of all debts
and claims, including the federal estate tax. What is the interplay
between this rule and the executor's election? If the executor deducts
an item of administration expense on his income tax return, there will
be a like decrease in estate tax deductions. There will then result an
increase in estate tax from the combination and interplay of (a) the
"loss" of the estate tax deduction for administration expenses and (b)
the reduction in the marital deduction, due to the fact that the net estate
from which the electing widow takes her share will be reduced by the
increase in estate tax. The effects of the interaction and the problem of
its solution are analogous to the determination of income tax where there
is a taxable reimbursement of tax.
Where the residuary estate is retained in trust with the remainder
interest to vest in a charity, the warping effect becomes almost circular.
If the executor elects to take an administration expense as an income
tax deduction, there will be an increase in estate tax. The increase in
estate tax will reduce the remainder. The reduction in the remainder
will reduce the charitable gift and the estate tax deduction therefor.
This has been called a discouraging "carousel of computations.")36
It is probably too early to predict that there will develop a sub-
stantial body of case law prescribing rules for apportionment or allo-
cation of estate income tax burdens and the benefit of deductions and
33 167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
34 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954).
35 Net estate is used in the Ohio probate sense: "In the event of election
to take under the statute of descent and distribution, such spouse shall take not
to exceed one-half of the net estate . . ." OHIo GEN. CODE § 10504-55 (1938)
now incorporated in Omo REv. CODE § 2107.39 (1953).
36 Miller, supra note 7, at 346.
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elections. However, if the case law does develop it is probably a safe
speculation that, in time, statutory rules will follow.
An obvious possible parallel has 'been development of rules in the
field of apportionment of death taxes. Litigation of the problems arising
in this area has produced a considerable body of case law, as well as
statutory rules, in many states."7 However, there are important differ-
ences, both in character and dollar value, between death tax apportion-
ment and estate income tax apportionment. Most commonly, death tax
apportionment questions flow out of the inclusion in the federal estate
tax 'base of transfers which are not subject to state probate administration.
Estate income tax apportionment problems are, generally speaking, intra-
mural. Death tax apportionment usually involves more dollars than the
income tax apportionment problem. In death tax apportionment the
question is where to place the ,burden of the tax, while in income tax
apportionment, the most common question is whether there should be an
adjustment to compensate for, at least partially, the warping effect of
an expense ,burden being borne by an interest, which absent adjustment,
gets no tax benefit or an increased tax. Common to both, however, is a
widely held conviction that tax benefit or burden should follow the same
road as the tax incident which gives rise to it.
The cases already discussed or cited arose out of a demand for
adjustment for the warping effect of the executor's election to deduct
administration expenses on the estate's income tax return. However, other
income tax apportionment or allocation questions arise out of the inter-
action between the federal income tax and state probate administration
rules. Where the executor receives and reports for taxation income
which will ultimately go to charity, he may claim a deduction for the
amount so set aside.3 8 Where estate income follows the residuary dis-
position and where there are both charitable and noncharitable residuary
beneficiaries, is the charitable ,beneficiary entitled to the benefit of the
charitable tax deduction claimed 'by -the executor on his income tax
return?
In Illinois, in Ginsberg 's Estate3 9 the appellate court held that
since nothing in the will referred to the federal income tax, that tax
was an expense of administration to be paid from corpus prior to dis-
tribution and charged equally to the beneficiaries without regard to their
character as taxable or exempt.40 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
37 A recent article on death tax apportionment contains a state-by-state sur-
vey in an appendix. Lauritzen, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 1 TAx
COUNSELOR'S QTRLY. 55 (1957).
3 81NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 642(c).
394 Ill. App. 2d 138, 123 N.E.2d 739 (1955).
40The approach of the Illinois court to estate income tax apportionment
where there is a charitable residuary legatee is akin to that of the Ohio Supreme
Court to a federal estate tax apportionment question. In YMCA v. Davis, 106
Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), aff'd 264 U.S. 47 (1924), the testatrix made
a number of specific devises and bequests to relatives and left the residue to
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declined to follow this precedent.41 Again the will was silent, but the
court presumed that the testatrix intended her dispositions to 'be subject
to the payment of taxes only to the extent that those gifts ordinarily
would be taxable under the federal income tax law. The court felt
that its view was strengthened by the fact that, if the executor had paid
or credited all of the income to the legatees during the tax year, the
estate would have had no income tax to pay, nor would the charities.
The court held that the entire burden of the estate income tax should
be borne by the noncharitable group. It was noted that this was a
question of apportionment of federal income taxes on estates, not
governed by any federal or state statute or controlling decision.
The decision in Rice42 involved a trust rather than an estate-but it
points up the problem posed by the unorthodox 'by-products of the 1954
Code. The income beneficiary received $241,000 of trust income, but
only $39,000 was taxable to him because of the net distributable income
concept. Most of this reduction resulted from some $202,000 of corpus
expenses. In the same year the trust had a capital gain with a tax of
$100,000 paid by the principal. The court required the income bene-
ficiary to repay the value to corpus of tax deductions allocated to the
income beneficiary under 1954 Code rules. The court noted, perhaps
wistfully, that "Prior to 1954, this case could not have arisen."
A discussion of cases not involving the effects of the executor's
election is an excursion from our immediate area. But whatever rules
develop governing adjustments for the warping effects of the executor's
election may well be only part of a general body of law dealing with
estate income tax allocations and adjustments.
The case law on adjustment for the effects on competing interests
of the executor's election is still in the incipient stage. Therefore, the
following general guides are set forth only tentatively.
First. An executor should carefully consider the tax effects
of his deduction election. When possible he should
take it where it does the most good tax-wise. The
California court in the Bixby case rated it as ap-
proaching a duty where there is a wide disparity in
rates.
Second. Receipt of a benefit should bear its correlative tax
burden; and the person or account charged with an
charities. The question was whether the federal estate tax was to be deducted
from the bequests to individuals or charged against the residue. Both the Ohio
and the United States Supreme Courts held that the estate tax was a charge
against the entire estate and that residuary legatees took only what was left
after payment of all charges including the estate tax. This case was followed in
principle, but without citation, in Hall v. Ball, 162 Ohio St. 299, 123 N.E.2d 259
(1954).
41Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Sanders, 125 A.2d 100 (R. I. 1956).
42 Estate of Rice, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 379, 6 Fiduciary 225 (Orphans' Ct. 1956).
1959]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
expense is entitled to the correlative tax benefit. How-
ever, it is doubtful that--express power being absent-
an executor has inherent power to make adjustments.
Third. In the words of the California court in the Bixby
case, the goal is that ". .. rights of all the takers under
the will remain vested in the posture prescribed by the
state rules governing rights and interests in the estates
of decedents, undisrupted and undisturbed by the
transient vagaries of the federal income tax laws."
3
When the executor has determined his better election course from
the tax dollar standpoint and when he sees that his election will produce
a benefit for one estate interest at the expense of another, what does he
do? These are possible courses:
(1) He might dodge the problem of adjusting for the warping
effects of the election, by deducting the expense on the
return which does not produce distortion, at the cost of
paying more taxes. However, an executor who pays
more federal taxes than he must, solely to preserve dis-
tribution symmetry, risks complaint by the estate bene-
ficiaries.
(2) He may seek instruction of the probate court. This, how-
ever, may be costly and time consuming, so that if possi-
ble he is best advised to:
(3) Bring together the affected beneficiaries, with their coun-
sel, and seek their concurrence in his proposed course of
election.
44
43 Estate of Bixby, supra note 23, at 399, 295 P.2d at 76. We are on the look-
out for non-transient vagaries. In any event the court may be unfair in its indict-
ment. The executor's election, in substantially its present form, was added in 1942
by Section 161 of the 1942 Revenue Act. As federal income tax vagaries go, this
one is relatively stable.
44How formal should such concurrence be? See articles, supra note 7.
Randall, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAx at 1027, says: "Until questions of this
type are ruled on by the courts of the various states, it is quite obvious that the
executor should consult with the interested parties (assuming they are all sui
juris) before exercising his election. He will point out the various alternatives
together with their respective economic results; and will endeavor to get the
parties to agree upon the course of action to be pursued and to reach an agree-
ment concerning their claims, if any, against one another." But Gradwohl, supra
note 7, at 362, n. 120, warns, "To the extent that the parties intentionally engage
in a manipulation of income tax which is later reimbursed by the benefiting
parties, there would appear to be the possibility of added income tax consequences
to either the party whose income tax is reimbursed by another, or to the party
whose income tax is paid for him for a fee. Also, where reimbursement is to be
made in the fiduciary accounts, it would seem that the executor would have a duty
to withhold the amounts which will be required to be repaid. But the amount may
be impossible to calculate at the time of the proposed distribution. See Third Nat'l
Bank v. Campbell, 145 N.E.2d 703 (Mass. 1957)."
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To summarize:
The executor has considerable- procedural freedom; he can defer
final decision until his answer becomes clearer.
The executor has some duty-not yet fully or finally expounded
by the courts-to hold down the aggregate of federal taxes within the
framework of his deduction election.
The executor must weigh not only the dollar effects, but distribution
effects, of his election. From the tax dollar standpoint it usually reduces
the total tax burden to take administration expenses as income tax de-
ductions, because of the higher income tax rate structure. Probate-wise,
expenses commonly are a principal charge. Here, tax benefit and expense
burden go off in opposite directions; a result which may strike bene-
ficiaries as shocking (or delightful). Thus, an adjustment may be called
for, either pursuant to court instruction or agreement of the beneficiaries.
Here, the executor's life may be a happier one if the will draftsman has
anticipated the problem and given him both wide discretion and criteria
to guide him in its exercise.4 5
45 See, e.g., Polster, Provqisions of Wills Affecting Estate Administration and
Their Tax Consequences, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 36, 41 (1959).
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